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Checking into China’s Cow Hotels: 
Have Post-Milk Scandal Policies Changed the Structure of the Dairy Sector? 
Abstract 
China’s Milk Scandal is well known for causing the nation’s largest food safety crisis and 
for its effect on thousands of children. Less, however, is known about the impact on the other 
victim, China’s small dairy farmers. Although small backyard producers were not the ones that 
added melamine to the milk supply, the incomes of dairy farmers fell sharply after the crisis. In 
response, one of the actions taken by the government was to encourage small dairy producers to 
check into production complexes that were supposed to supply services, new technologies and 
provide for easy/bulk procurement of the milk produced by the cows of the farmers. Because 
both farmers and his/her cows were living (and working) away from home, in the rest of the 
paper we call these complexes ―cow hotels.‖ In this paper we examine the dynamics of China’s 
dairy production structure before and after the Milk Scandal. In particular, we seek to gain a 
better understanding about how China’s policies have been successful in encouraging farmers to 
move from the backyard into cow hotels. We also seek to find if larger or smaller farmers 
respond differently to these policy measures. 
 
Using data from a sample of farmers from dairy-producing villages in Greater Beijing, 
our empirical analysis finds that one year after the Milk Scandal, the dairy production structure 
changed substantially. Approximately one quarter (26%) of the sample checked into cow hotels 
after the Milk Scandal, increasing from 2% before the crisis. Our results also demonstrate that 
the increase in cow hotel production can largely be attributed to China’s dairy policies. Finally, 
our results suggest that the effects of government policy differ across farm sizes; China’s dairy 
policies are more likely to persuade larger farms to join cow hotels. Apparently, larger farms 
benefit more when they join cow hotels. Overall, these results suggest that during the first year 
after the crisis, the government policies have been effective in moving some of the backyard 




Checking into China’s Cow Hotels: 
Have Post-Milk Scandal Policies Changed the Structure of the Dairy Sector? 
China’s Milk Scandal of 2008 struck when it was discovered that milk 
suppliers (traders and milk collection stations) were adding melamine, a colorless 
crystalline compound, to artificially boost the protein readings of their milk (Xin and 
Stone, 2008). In July 2008 the initial reports emerged about child health cases in 
Gansu Province. Two months later melamine made it for the first time to the headlines 
of many of China’s domestic newspapers when a connection between Sanlu Group’s 
baby formula and the Gansu health cases was confirmed by the Ministry of Health. 
The media—both inside and outside of China—then covered the incident extensively 
and it was revealed that about 300,000 children became sick (Barboza, 2008). The 
Milk Scandal, as we call it in the rest of this paper, was born and before it was over it 
affected food supplies in scores of nations and every one of China’s provinces (Chen, 
2009). Distrusting consumers dramatically reduced demand. Small dairy farmers, who 
were not the ones that contaminated the milk, had no option but to dump their milk 
and the income of millions of farm households was negatively affected (The 
Economist, 2008).   
China’s government responded on many fronts as the Milk Scandal unfolded. 
A series of policies were issued to both reduce the impact on small farmers in the 
short run as well as to stop the flow of milk through a broken milk marketing system 
and to create a new system of milk marketing in the place of the broken one. One of 
the main goals of the government of China in recent years has been to raise the 
income of rural households (one of the specific objectives of the Ministry of  
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Agriculture is to double the rural income—as of 2008—by the year 2020 with an 
annual increase of 6%—Xinhua News, 2010). Because of the damages suffered by 
farmers who were forced to dump their milk and scale back production, an income 
management policy was rolled out to support the incomes and livelihoods of 
producers (China News, 2008a).   
At the same time, efforts were also made to regulate and restore the marketing 
chains that had broken down when dairy processing firms were not allowed to buy 
milk from many of the agents that had been operating in the pre-Milk Scandal supply 
chain (State Council, 2008). The overall goal of the marketing management policy 
was to build a supply chain that was able to deliver safe milk to processing plants. 
Since it was suspected that a large share of the contamination had occurred in the 
collection station/middle-of-the-chain marketing firms segment of the supply chain, 
any milk collection station that failed government inspection was closed down and 
unqualified buyers were banned from the market (China News, 2008b). After supply 
chains were purged of many of the suspected suppliers of contaminated milk, the 
government began to invest in upgrading buying/collection stations to restore the 
chain (Sohu News, 2008). In the rest of this paper, the set of policies which aimed to 
create and implement regulations on milk buying and delivery is called China’s 
Marketing Management Policies.   
Given the nature and high profile of China’s Milk Scandal and vigor of the 
government’s response, there is surprisingly little empirical evidence that is available 
to help us understand these policies and their impacts on the dairy industry. There are  
3 
 
a wide range of government documents, media reports and anecdotal studies that 
describe the policies (e.g., Hebei Provincial People’s Congress, 2009; Chen, 2010). 
There are a large number of reports that track the fate of those families with children 
affected by the melamine-laced milk products (First Financial Daily, 2008). However, 
there is almost no paper that seeks to measure the impacts on the dairy producers. One 
exception is the work of Jia et al. (2011). They use village- and farm-level data from 
the Greater Beijing Region to econometrically analyze the effect of the government 
policies on dairy producers. Their analysis demonstrates that, although dairy 
participation fell and herd sizes were reduced after the Milk Scandal, Marketing 
Management Policies helped limit the fall of output.   
Despite the importance of the paper by Jia et al. (2011) and their findings, 
there is no work, to our knowledge, that seeks to understand how China’s policies 
affect the structure of production. This itself is puzzling given that one of the 
government’s goals of its overall dairy policy was to encourage producers to organize 
themselves in ways that would allow for both more efficient production and more 
effective monitoring of quality. Before the Milk Scandal, China’s dairy production 
was dominated by poor, small-scale farmers with fewer than 5 cows/household (Zhou 
et al., 2002; Huang et al., 2010). At the time of the emergence of the Milk Scandal, 
the small farmer-dominated, fractured structure of China’s dairy sector was thought to 
be (at least in part) at fault for the crisis—either directly or indirectly. Indeed, one of 
the goals of the Marketing Management Policies was to get the supply chain to 
procure from larger and more reliable dairy farms (Wei, 2008). Incentives were given  
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to marketing agents to procure from larger dairy units. Subsidies were provided to 
larger dairy units to install equipments that would aid more efficient and safe 
marketing. Jia et al. (2011), however, does not seek to understand how China’s 
Marketing Management Policies affected the production structure. 
The absence of attention to the impact on the structure of dairy production per 
se is understandable because Marketing Management Policies (the main focus of the 
work of Jia et al., 2011) were not designed to directly change the way of raw milk 
production. When the first Marketing Management Policies were being rolled out, 
most of China’s dairy cows were still in the backyards. It was for this reason that 
China’s policy makers designed and implemented another policy that sought to 
directly change the production structure of China’s dairy industry. In the early months 
after the Milk Scandal, government officials issued policy directives that ordered local 
officials to try to convince small, backyard farmers to move their cows into 
concentrated production complexes (People’s Government of Hebei Province, 2008; 
People’s Government of Shanxi Province, 2008; People’s Government of Zhejiang 
Province, 2008, among others). At the time these complexes (the ones that existed) 
were both publicly and privately managed (Appendix 1, row 9-13). The reason (given 
in the initial policy documents) for the preference for large complexes was to provide 
dairy farmers with the access to modern production practices and to facilitate better 
monitoring of the production practices. Ultimately, the policy was designed on the 
assumption that when dairy cows and dairy farmers were brought to a centralized 
complex, it would facilitate the production of more sanitary and higher quality milk.  
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This paper’s primary goal is to study the policy of concentrating the operations 
of small dairy farmers into the complexes as a way to change the structure of China’s 
dairy industry and upgrade dairy production. These concentrated production 
complexes (called ―yangzhi xiaoqu” in policy documents) provide us with the 
important tool to investigate structural changes. Since the creation of the complexes is 
implemented by requiring dairy farmers to bring their cows from their home and 
―check them into the complexes‖ in the same way people check themselves into 
guesthouses and lodgings when they leave home, we call these complexes ―cow 
hotels.‖ The complex could also be called ―dairy farmer hotel‖ because in many cases 
the complex is so far from a dairy farmer’s home village that he/she is unable to go 
back and forth two to three times a day to milk, feed and take care of his/her dairy 
cows. As a result, the farmer will also check himself/herself into the complex and live 
there.   
A cow hotel is a state- or privately-owned dairy cow production and milking 
complex. Both milk production and collection takes place in a single, centralized 
location. The cows in the hotel are brought in by a number of different individual 
farmers who often will live inside the complex also (in a small dormitory room or 
stand-alone hut). A dairy complex is typically managed by a single manager that is in 
charge of coordinating the breeding, milking and marketing. The dairy farmers take 
care of their own cows and are subject to the rules and regulations of the cow hotel. 
In summary, the cow hotels distinguish themselves from the traditional 
backyard farms in a specific way: A cow hotel is a centralized location that is  
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provided for the housing of larger scale of herds; farmers in many cow hotels are 
asked to follow uniform procedures to carry out breeding and milking and marketing 
their milk (Appendix 1, row 14-18). The set of policies that were implemented to 
facilitate and encourage farmers to join, or check into, cow hotels are thus called Cow 
Hotel Policies. 
Although the Cow Hotel Policy documents and efforts of the government to 
implement the policy are clear, the question remains how effective the policies have 
been in convincing backyard farmers to join cow hotels. While there are benefits 
associated with cow hotel farming, there are obvious costs as well. Media and 
government reports have mostly focused on the efficiency and welfare gains of the 
farmers in joining cow hotels (Zhangjiakou News, 2009; The Economic Daily, 2010). 
Some argue that cow hotel farming could lead to productivity improvement with scale 
economies and upgraded facilities (Dairy Times, 2010; MOA, 2011). Importantly, 
since farmers are required by their contracts to sell the raw milk to the marketing 
division of the cow hotel (Appendix 1, row 19 and 20), it could be providing a better 
access to the output market (as often with larger-scale production structures) 
(Swinnen, 2009). However, other anecdotal studies and reports suggest that cow 
hotels are not always efficient (Chen and Zhang, 2010). In some hotels there is 
inadequate investment into the hotel’s facilities, technologies and/or management; 
cows may be at higher risk of disease because of the increased herd size. In addition, 
as farmers need to take care of the cows in the hotel, they incur higher commuting 
costs (or the psychological costs of living away from home), compared to when their  
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cows are being raised in their own backyards. Using the services of cow hotels also 
can impose other direct and indirect costs on farmers since they often live far from 
their own villages (Farmer’s Daily, 2010; Li, 2010). 
The goal of our study is to gain a better understanding of which farmers (with 
what characteristics) are most likely to join cow hotels and whether the Cow Hotel 
Policy was effective in inducing farmers to check into cow hotels. As the benefits and 
costs associated with cow hotel farming (introduced above) are likely to differ for 
farms with different herd sizes, it could be that larger farms enjoy more efficiency 
gains and less per unit costs than smaller farms. Consequently, policies may exhibit 
heterogeneous effects on large and small farmer’s propensity to join cow hotel. 
To meet this goal we have three specific objectives. First, we will examine the 
dynamics of China’s dairy production structure before and after the Milk Scandal. 
Second, we will attempt to measure how the two sets of policies, China’s Marketing 
Management Policy and the Cow Hotel Policy (especially) have influenced dairy 
farmers to join cow hotels (and/or have failed to move them out of backyard 
production). Third, we will estimate the heterogeneous effects of the policies on 
farmers. Do larger and smaller farmers respond differently to these policy measures?   
Due to limited funding and organizational resources, we restrict the scope of 
our study to dairy production structures in the Greater Beijing Region. It could be the 
case that the policies are different across regions and the effects of these policies in  
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our study region have limited generalizability to other regions.
1
  There also are other 
questions that might be of equal interest. For example, it would be interesting to 
evaluate the effect of China’s post-Milk Scandal policies on the quality of milk. Did 
the measures lead to higher standards of production? These questions are beyond the 
scope of our study, which, however, could be important topics for future research.   
China’s Dairy Industry and Farms 
Demand and supply of dairy products have changed dramatically during the 
past two decades. In the 1990s there was only one major commodity that China’s 
consumers were under-consuming: dairy. The average urban resident in 1992 
consumed nine kilograms per capita of dairy products (measured in milk equivalents), 
only a fraction of the level in many other nations. Since that time, however, dairy 
demand, especially in urban areas, has exploded (Zhou et al., 2002).   
As dairy demand rose, dairy production also increased sharply (Fuller et al., 
2005, 2006). In the mid-1990s, China’s dairy industry produced only six to seven 
million tons (Liu, 2003-2009). From the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s, the growth of 
dairy production accelerated to nearly 20 percent annually. Aggregate production rose 
to more than 35 million tons in 2007, a level that ranked China the third in the world 
after US and India.   
                                                 
1  However, for a number of reasons, we believe that it is interesting and informative to study the case of Greater 
Beijing. Beijing was one of the first regions that noticed urinary tract stones in infants (Chen, 2009). Moreover, 
although the crisis was national, the issue was ranked as the top priority on the agenda of the State Council during 
the first months after the Scandal in Beijing (as well as a number of other provinces). Provincial documents also 
show that similar policies have been designed in many other provinces to counter the crisis (People’s Government 
of Hebei Province, 2008; People’s Government of Shanxi Province, 2008; People’s Government of Zhejiang 
Province, 2008, among others). Such documents also exist for Beijing and these show that the crisis was real and 
serious in Beijing (Wei, 2008). In addition, because of the fact that one of the major impacts of the crisis was the 
collapse of demand across China, including Beijing, the crisis was indeed nationwide (again: including Beijing).  
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Who was producing China’s milk? By any measure, China’s dairy industry 
heavily depended on small farmers. In the mid-1990s the average dairy household 
owned and milked only three cows (Zhou et al., 2002). During the following years, 
although the overall herd size rose steadily (to more than 12 million dairy cows in 
2007), the average herd size per family rose only gradually (Liu, 2003-2009). In the 
mid 2000s more than 80 percent of the dairy cows were owned by small households 
scattered across the country (Lu, Tao and Woo, 2009).   
To procure, transport and process the milk in China’s economy, a huge and 
competitive downstream segment of the dairy industry has emerged (Lu, Tao and Woo, 
2009). Foreign firms and large corporations, mixed with small-scale local firms, 
increased the quality of and expanded the capacity of the dairy processing sector. 
Although industry players with names such as Sanlu, Yili and Mengniu (domestically) 
as well as Nestle, Fonterra and Danone (foreign) were most prominent, there were 
also thousands of other firms. Competition within China’s major dairy markets 
intensified. During the 2000s inter-regional competition in both product sales and 
milk sourcing also became fiercer. As this occurred, dairy firms were pressured to 
keep costs low, even at the expense of milk quality.   
China’s Milk Scandal and the Government’s Response 
  A Harvard Business School case study written by Lu, Tao and Woo (2009) 
listed and described the fundamental pressures in the industry that they believe 
ultimately led firms to begin to use melamine in China’s dairy supply chains.
1  The 
competition (described above) began to exert downward pressure on product prices.  
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Lower prices led to falling profit margins. Facing price pressures from above, dairy 
companies, in turn, began to counter by transferring some of the competitive pressures 
to milk-collection stations and dairy farmers. Moreover, during the same period 
government officials across China were encouraging the large downstream dairy 
companies, who often were directly owned by or indirectly tied to the government, 
not to raise prices. The profits of the milk-collection stations and dairy farmers 
continued to be squeezed.   
Being at the very upper end of the highly competitive dairy supply chain, there 
were not too many margins on which either dairy farmers or local buyers/dealers 
could move on to try to earn higher profits and reduce costs. There was one, however, 
on which some farmers and buyers/dealers tried to move. Since payment to dairy 
farmers and local buyers for their milk was largely based on the volume they supplied, 
adding water would increase their sales volume. In fact, the press reported extensively 
on cases in which in some places and at some times both dairy farmers and first-tier 
buyers in China had been found watering down milk to increase their sales volumes. 
In response, processing firms and their agents changed the rules of procurement. They 
began to set standards for the milk that they procured from dairy farmers based on the 
milk’s protein content.   
Enter melamine. To circumvent the testing (which could detect water being 
added to the milk), some milk suppliers (mostly traders and milk collection stations) 
began adding melamine to artificially boost the protein readings of their milk (Xin 
and Stone, 2008; Gale and Hu, 2009). This was possible, since dairies commonly  
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tested for protein content of milk by measuring the milk’s crude protein level. 
Measured this way, testing protocols were unable to detect if the total quantity of 
nitrogen in milk was either protein-based (from the milk itself) or non-protein-based 
(from the melamine).
2
   
Why was this not picked up at the dairy processing level? Two factors suggest 
that, the firms knew that their raw milk was contaminated. First, all the firms 
themselves were simultaneously facing profit squeezes and pressures to increase 
production. Second, the quality control system that China’s Administration of Quality 
Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine (AQSIQ) was in charge of was mainly based 
on self-regulation. There were no third parties in charge of inspecting the quality of 
China’s milk supply. These two factors—temptations for higher profits (or the need to 
avoid falling profits) and low probabilities of getting caught—led to China’s 2008 
Milk Scandal.   
The Scope of the Scandal and Its Consequences 
The scandal itself is defined by a long sequence of events that began with 
children being tested positive for kidney stones at abnormally high rates in Gansu, a 
poor province in western China, and ended with many countries across the globe and 
every province in China testing dairy products for melamine and banning thousands 
of products that came out of China’s dairy and other food manufacturing firms.   
                                                 
2
  The government policies have now focused new attention on a number of different aspects of China’s dairy 
production and marketing chains. However, the policies do not address explicitly the ways that the inspection 
system is supposed to measure milk for protein content. This may have been part of the problem originally (and 
may still be a problem today). For instance, the Kjeldahl method is unable to detect differences between the true 
(organic) protein levels in milk from non-protein nitrogen ones. However, more advanced approaches (such as 
spectroscopy—which can) were not included explicitly into the legislation. We feel the policy implication here is 
clear: China’s dairy inspection system should not rely on ineffective technologies, such as the Kjeldahl method.  
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Popular press coverage throughout the end of 2008 and 2009 focused mostly 
on the civil and criminal consequences of the scandal (Zhongshan News, 2009). In the 
end punishments for the 300,000 victims that became sick, the six confirmed deaths 
and billions of dollars of economic disruption were given out. Two people were 
executed. Another one was given a suspended death penalty. Five others received 
from 15 years to life imprisonment. At least seven government officials, as well as the 
Director of the Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine 
(AQSIQ) were fired or forced to resign.   
One aspect of the Milk Scandal that has been much less reported on and less 
understood, is the impact that the Scandal had on the millions of dairy farmers. After 
the Milk Scandal, as might be expected, farmers were hit hard and by a number of 
different factors. First, and most directly, as the Milk Scandal was unfolding, one of 
the first responses of government regulators was to shut down production in suspected 
dairy processing firms. This means, of course, that in many cases there was an 
immediate impact since many dairy households could find no one else to procure their 
milk (or, if they found a buyer, the milk was only procured at a fraction of the cost of 
production).   
While the shutdown of processing firms by regulators in the immediate 
aftermath of the Milk Scandal hurt farmers, this effect paled in comparison to the 
ultimate cost. With consumer confidence in the quality of all domestically-produced 
dairy products low, consumer demand for dairy products plummeted (NDRC, 2008). 
Production followed. Nationwide, after growth of production between 2006 and 2007  
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of more than 3.3 million tons (10 percent year on year growth), production stagnated 
between 2007 and 2008 and fell between 2008 and 2009 (China Dairy Statistical 
Report, 2010). 
What was the nature of the fall in production and its impact on 
dairy-producing communities? While it is difficult using national level data to assess 
exactly how production fell and small dairy farmers were affected, we can see several 
regularities. First, there was an acceleration in the fall in the number of dairy farmers. 
In Tianjin the number of dairy-producing households fell between 2007 and 2008 by 5 
percent (Liu, 2003-2009). In Liaoning the number of dairy-producing households fell 
by 23 percent. Second, there also was widespread reporting of farmers that were 
forced to discard their milk, pouring it into landfills, fields and dry riverbeds 
(Ministry of Finance, 2008). Finally, a crisis in the dairy sector meant a crisis for 
many poor communities and the poor farmers inside them. The progress that the 
government had made over the past several years in raising farm incomes was 
threatening to be reversed (State Council of Central Committee of Communist Party 
of China, 2008, 2009).   
Policy Response 
  In response to both the consumer and producer crises that were triggered by the 
Milk Scandal, the government’s top leader, Premier Wen Jiabao, made a public 
announcement that addressed many dimensions of the crisis. In particular, he 
committed his government to revamping the policy environment, ―… the crisis has 
revealed the shortcomings of government supervision [and policy] … The situation  
14 
 
must be rectified immediately‖ (Lu, Tao and Woo, 2009). One of the main goals of the 
policy response was to change the production structure of China’s dairy industry to 
make it more modern and more capable to adopt new technologies that could produce 
high quality milk (People’s Government of Hebei Province, 2008).
3
  The target of this 
policy was focused on increasing the size of dairy farms and reducing the dependence 
of the sector on small backyard farms (Chen, 2010).  
In fact, the Wen government kept its promise of rapid policy response. As is 
often associated with China’s policy making environment, when there is a crisis, the 
government responds and does so in many different dimensions. Although the total 
list of policy responses is quite long, in the case of the responses directed at producers 
they can be divided into two main types: Marketing Management Policy and the Cow 
Hotel Policy (see the introduction for the discussion on these policies). In the rest of 
this paper we seek to understand the effectiveness of these policies in changing the 
production structure of the dairy industry.   
Data 
Data for this study are based on a panel survey that was conducted in 2005 and 
2009 in the Greater Beijing area. In 2005 dairy production data at the village- (or 
community-) and household-levels were collected as part of a larger survey effort (the 
Greater Beijing Horticulture and Livestock Survey), which investigated the 
                                                 
3
  To strengthen their inspection capabilities, China’s General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection 
and Quarantine (AQSIQ) issued a statement ―Determination of melamine in raw milk and dairy products‖ (GB/T 
22388—2008) on Oct. 7th, 2008. This announcement stated that milk inspectors should use one of three 
measurement techniques: high performance liquid chromatography (HPLC), liquid chromatogram 
mass-spectrography (LC-MS/MS) and/or gas chromatography mass-spectrography (GC-MS) to test melamine.  
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production and marketing of high value agricultural commodities in the area of 
Greater Beijing.
2 
In the first year of the survey, 2005, the authors relied on a spatially-based 
sampling strategy to choose the 50 townships and 200 villages from which we would 
collect information of dairy production at the community level (and which would 
ultimately be used to choose our dairy households. To sample villages, a GIS 
sampling approach was begun by delineating the Greater Beijing into five concentric 
circles with the geographical center of Beijing (Tian’anmen). The concentric circles 
were further divided into 10 wedges by drawing 10 ―spokes‖ (140 kilometers in 
length) from the center (viz. Tian’anmen) to the edge of the outermost circle. Each 
wedge was defined by two spokes that created a 36 degree angle. The spokes cut 
every concentric circle into 10 arcs, creating a total of 50 arcs. On every 36 degree arc, 
one randomly selected point was marked. The township geographically located 
linearly closest to the randomly selected point was included in our sample population. 
In total, 50 townships were randomly selected with the aid of a GIS mapping program. 
Within each township, 4 villages were then randomly selected to create a sample 
population of 200 villages.   
In each of the sample villages an enumeration team, led by the authors, 
conducted a community survey. To do so, the authors interviewed village leaders 
about the changes in the community’s horticultural and livestock (including dairy) 
economy between 2000 and 2004. During the sit-down questionnaire survey, village 
leaders recounted the general information of communities and the production of the  
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village’s major high-value commodities. In the case that dairy farming was identified, 
the authors labeled the village as a dairy village and further asked detailed questions 
(namely, percentage of dairy farmers, average herd size, the distribution of households 
with different herd size, the distance to the nearest collection station/dairy processing 
firm, the number of milk stations in local village and in neighborhood villages, etc.). 
The authors eventually identified 25 dairy villages and 175 non-dairy villages from 
among the 200 sample villages.   
After the conclusion of the community survey (and identification of the dairy 
villages), the first round of our household dairy survey in 2005 was conducted in the 
25 dairy villages. To execute the survey several steps were taken. First, in each village 
all households were divided into two groups based on whether or not they owned 
cows. In other words, all households were labeled as a dairy farmer (or dairy 
household) or nondairy farmer (or nondairy household). Second, we devised a 
sampling scheme that was used to draw a sample of dairy and nondairy farmers. In 
villages where the number of dairy farmers was more than 50, 20 farmers were 
randomly selected –– 14 dairy households and 6 nondairy households. In the cases of 
villages in which the number of dairy farmers was higher than 7 but lower than 50, 
the authors randomly sampled 10 farmers in total––7 dairy farmers and 3 nondairy 
farmers. When the total number of dairy farmers in a village was lower than 7, the 
authors surveyed all the dairy farmers. The 2005 household survey include 243 
farmers in total; 63 percent of them were dairy farmers. For some basic production  
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activities, such as participation in dairy farming and herd size, we asked households 
about both the current year (2005) and a point of time four years earlier (2000).   
During the 2005 household survey, in different blocks of the survey farmers were 
asked about their individual, household and dairy characteristics. Enumerators 
collected information on the age, education level and employment history of each 
household member. The value of the household’s assets was collected in an attempt 
to assess each family’s wealth. Respondents also provided information in the nature 
of their dairy activities, including their participation history distinguishing backyard 
farming, cow hotel farming and non-dairy activities, their herd size and location if 
they are dairy farmers.   
In October of 2009 (about one year after the Scandal) we organized a second 
round of the village and household surveys. The idea was to track the evolution of 
the dairy producers, their activities and the policies that they faced in the same 
villages and same households that had been interviewed in 2005 as a way of 
assessing the impact of the Scandal.
3 
To the greatest extent possible our strategy in the second round was to ask the 
same respondents the same questions (complemented with questions specific to the 
Milk Scandal). To do so, we began with a second round of the community survey. 
Enumerators asked the village leaders (which in more than half of the villages were 
the same) the same set of questions as they did in the first round.   
The household survey was also repeated. The same information that was 
collected in 2004 was collected again. In addition, and in order to be able to more  
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precisely pin down the effect of the Milk Scandal, we asked farmers to recount their 
dairy production activities for the year before the crisis in 2008 (pre-Scandal dairy 
activities) and at the time of the survey for 2009 (post-Scandal dairy activities). A 
section was added on their perceptions about the way that the government’s post 
Milk Scandal policies affected their dairy operations.     
Finally, in addition to repeating the village and household surveys we also 
conducted a survey of the officials that were in charge of dairy policies at the 
township level (in each of the sample townships). In total the 25 villages in our 
sample were located in 15 townships. In these 15 township surveys we were mainly 
interested in documenting the exact dates that dairy policy actions were issued from 
county officials to township leaders that were placed in charge of dairy production in 
each township. The questions were organized in a way that allowed us to pinpoint the 
policy efforts and timing of a.) the Production Management Policies; and b.) the 
Marketing Management Policies. The timing of the policy actions were recorded on a 
month by month basis.   
Based on the two rounds of survey, we are able to create a panel of townships, 
villages and households. We include all 121 dairy households in our sample in 
August 2008, which refers to a baseline before the Scandal. The panel continues with 
the month end of September in 2008 when the Scandal was exposed on the public 
media and October when a set of national interventions as a prompt response to the 
crisis which was disclosed. The data is then followed by month January, May, and 
September in 2009. Therefore, in total we have 726 observations.  
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Definition of Variables 
The data described in the preceding section are used to produce information 
to meet our objective of tracking dairy production before and after the Milk Scandal. 
To do so, we need to create variables tracking dairy production and post-Milk 
Scandal policies and their implementation after the Scandal. We also need to create a 
number of other variables that might affect dairy production in order to be able to 
improve the estimation efficiency of the effects of the government’s policy response.   
Dependent Variables: Farm Organization 
We use three dependent variables to indicate, respectively, whether a farmer 
has checked himself into a cow hotel, continues to operate as a backyard producer or 
has dropped out of dairy production. The dummy variable, Cow Hotel Producer, 
equals 1 if at the end of the time period the farmer joined a cow hotel, and equals 0 
otherwise. Similarly defined, the dummy variable, Backyard Producer, equals 1 if 
the farmer continued to produce as a backyard farmer at the end of the time period, 
and equals 0 otherwise. Finally, the dummy variable, Exited the Dairy Sector, equals 
1 if the farmers left dairy production between the start and the end of the time period, 
and equals 0 otherwise. 
Independent Variables of Interest: Policy Variables 
We asked township leaders to tell us exactly the initial time (by month) that 
they were mobilized (by upper level policy makers) to move backyard dairy 
operations into cow hotels. The variable, Cow Hotel Policy, is generated from this  
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information as a dummy variable that equals 1 if the policy has been implemented 
and equals 0 if it has not been implemented.   
To create a variable to measure the implementation of the Marketing 
Management Policy in each sample township, we asked each township leader 
whether he/she had ever received a policy document (from the county government) 
that did any of the following: a.) ordering the township to begin inspections of milk 
procurement stations; or b.) upgrading milk procurement stations in the townships 
with promises of subsidies for the stations. The approach that we used to create the 
variable, Marketing Management Policy, is similar with the approach that we used to 
create the variable Cow Hotel Policy. Specifically, Marketing Management Policy is 
a variable that equals 1 if the policy has been implemented and 0 if it has not been 
implemented.   
Control Variables 
We also used our data to create a number of control variables. The variable 
Herd size is a household-level variable indicating the number of cows that the 
household owned before the Scandal. It is a number that is greater than or equal to 0. 
The variable Education equals the number of years of educational attainment of the 
household head. The variable Age is measured as the age of the household head. The 
variable Percentage of off-farm labor is measured by dividing the accumulated days 
of household members working off-farm over the total working days of them. To 
measure household wealth, we collected and aggregated the value of the housing 
assets, furniture and other durable consumption assets. Asset value per capita is  
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created by dividing household wealth before the Scandal by the total number of 
household members. Finally, we also created the variable Dairy training to indicate 
whether any member of the household has participated in dairy training before the 
Scandal. The variable equals 1 if at least one member received training and equals 0 if 
none of them had any training.   
  Finally, we create two control variables at the community level. The village 
leader was asked whether there were villagers working in dairy firm before the 
Scandal. Based on this information, we created the variable of Villager in dairy firm 
which equals 1 if there were at least one villager who had been working in a dairy 
firm and 0 if no one had worked in dairy firms before the time of the survey. In 
addition, we also asked the village leader (the respondent for the community survey 
form) to tell us the total number of households and the number of dairy farms in the 
village before the Scandal. We created a variable of Percentage of dairy households 
in the village as an indicator for dairy production in the village.   
Dairy production structures in Greater Beijing before and after the Milk Scandal 
Our data show that in October 2008, one month after the Milk Scandal and the 
initial month of government policies, the proportion of cow hotel producers rose 
sharply (Table 1). Before the Milk Scandal (August 2008) and the month when the 
Scandal broke out (September 2008), only 2% of all 121 dairy households were 
producing in cow hotels (row 1 and 2).
4  One month later, it increased to 17% (row 3). 
The flow to cow hotels continued after October, but at a slower rate: one year after the 
Milk Scandal the share of farms in cow hotels was 26% (row 6). Consistently,  
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backyard producers decreased from 98% in August 2008 (row 1) to only 60% in 
September 2009 (row 6). Some of them moved to cow hotels (26%) and others 
dropped out of dairy production (14%—row 6).
4
   
Our data also show that once the Milk Scandal surfaced, government action 
was taken swiftly across many of our sample areas (Table 2). It is not surprising that 
no policy action penetrated to towns to combat the crisis in August and September 
2008, since the Scandal had just broken out in September. By the end of October, 
however, 8 out of 14 townships had received policy directives for the Cow Hotel 
Policy and had started implementation (Table 2, row 1). In the following months, the 
Cow Hotel Policy spread to other townships. The directive to move dairy cows into 
cow hotels were announced in all townships but one in our sample by the end of 
September 2009 (row 1). The Marketing Management Policy was rolled out as 
quickly as the Cow Hotel Policy: 9 of the township leaders told us during the survey 
that they had received policy directives in October 2008 (row 2). Interestingly, no new 
townships received this policy in the following months (row 2).   
Descriptive cross-tabulations that relate the rollout of the policies in the 
sample townships to cow hotel production show that both of the policies seem to be 
associated with the increase in cow hotel production (Table 3). In the one township 
where the leader had not received Cow Hotel Policy directives by the end of 
September 2009, no cow hotel production was found (row 1). In the townships that 
were targeted by the Cow Hotel Policy, an abrupt increase of cow hotel producers was 
                                                 
4
  According to our data, 90 percent of farmers who exited dairy production sold their cows to other farmers; only 
10 percent of the farmers that exited dairy production decided to slaughter their cows.  
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found. The proportion of cow hotel producer increased from 2% in September 2008 to 
18% in October (row 2).   
A similar pattern is found for Marketing Management Policy. Cow hotel 
production increased much faster in the townships that been covered by the Marketing 
Management Policy than in the townships that had not been the target of the 
marketing policies. In October 2008 cow hotel producers increased from 1% to 20% 
in the townships with the marketing policies; in contrast, there was no increase in the 
townships without them (row 3 and 4). Possibly due to the more widespread (albeit 
more gradual) Cow Hotel Policy (which reached a number of townships that the 
Marketing Management Policy did not), in the later months cow hotel production rose 
gradually slightly to 9% by May 2009 and 13% by September 2009 (row 3) in the 
townships without the Marketing Management Policy. 
The other evidence that we get from our data is that the trend of cow hotel 
production is consistent for our sample townships before the policies were 
implemented (Table 3). Although the townships with different dairy production and 
marketing policies started off with slightly different ratios of cow hotel production, 
the ratios do not change in the two months preceding the policies (Table 3, August and 
September 2009). In other words, township-level time-varying variables seem to have 
little impact on cow hotel production, though it does underline the importance to 
include township fixed effects to account for a different starting point in our 
multivariate analysis.    
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Table 4, however, shows that the policies seem to have different effects on 
producers with different pre-Scandal herd sizes. Given that producers were in areas 
that were targeted by the Cow Hotel Policy, larger producers appear to be more likely 
to join cow hotels (the percentages of cow hotel producers in the group with herd 
sizes equal to or smaller than 5, larger than 5 and smaller than 11, and larger than 10 
are, respectively, 16%, 24% and 50% —row 2). Similarly, the Marketing Management 
Policy appears to have a stronger effect on larger producers; the percentages for the 
three groups of herd size are 18%, 28% and 46%—row 4.   
Finally, Table 5 shows that some of the pre-Scandal household characteristics 
seem to be associated with production structures as well.
5
  For example, households 
which joined cow hotels seem to have, on average, younger household heads, fewer 
household assets and have worked less off-farm before the Milk Scandal (row 5-10). 
In contrast, households which continued backyard production seem to have older 
household heads with more household assets (row 3-8).   
Although the descriptive statistics provide us with interesting evidence of the 
changes in production structures and how the policies may have contributed to these 
changes, they are of little help in disentangling the effects of the two policies, the 
effect of the dairy crisis and other confounding factors. For example, due to the 
overlap in timing and areas of the two policies (and the dairy crisis), it is impossible 
to satisfactorily attribute the part of increase in cow hotel production to each of the 
                                                 
5
  We do not include the post-Scandal characteristics as controls because they may be affected by the policies that 
were implemented to counter the Milk Scandal. If these characteristics are also correlated with the production 
decisions of farmers (that is, if the farmer moved his/her dairy cows into the cow hotel), they might not act as 
efficiency-enhancing control variables in our regressions (Angrist and Pischke, 2008).  
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two policies without multivariate analysis. Therefore, we include all the policy 
variables and the control variables in the multivariate analysis in the next section. 
Econometric analysis 
In this section we present a comprehensive econometric analysis to examine 
the impact of government policies on dairy production structures. We first discuss our 
estimation approach. We then present and discuss the results. 
Baseline specification 
In estimating the impact of policies on the structure of dairy production, we 
use a fixed effects estimation approach to control for non-time varying township 
effects and include a large set of household-level characteristics to improve the 
efficiency of the analysis.   
In particular, in this paper we estimate the following linear probability model: 
E [yijt=1|Pjt
C,Pjt
M, Crisist, Xijt, Trendt]= δ1Pjt
C+δ2Pjt
M+βCrisist+γ´Xijt+μTrendt+λj       (1) 
where yijt is the dependent variable for household i in town j and in month t. In the 
first regression, it is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the household is a 
cow hotel producer and 0 if the household is not a cow hotel producer. In the second 
regression, it equals 1 if the household is a backyard producer and equals 0 if it is not 
a backyard producer. In the third regression, it equals 1 if the household has exited the 
dairy sector and equals 0 if it still engages in dairy production. The Cow Hotel Policy 
is represented by Pjt
C and the Marketing Management Policy is represented by Pjt
M . 
We also include a variable Crisist which takes on value 0 before September 2008, the 
critical month of the breakout of the Milk Scandal, and it takes on value 1 after the  
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critical month. The Crisis variable is used to capture the effect of crisis on the 
structure of dairy production. The vector Xijt includes a series of control variables such 
as pre-Scandal household and village characteristics (as defined in the previous 
section). We insert a time trend Trendt which measures the number of months since 
August 2008 to capture the common trend. We also include township fixed effects, λj, 
in order to take account of the township unobservables that may be correlated with 
non-time varying township policies and other factors (which might influence dairy 
production structures). 
We choose to use a linear probability model for the estimation for a number 
of reasons. First, the linear probability model (the model we use) and a logit (or 
probit) model (which we do not use), in general, produce similar estimates. The 
main difference is that the linear probability model is less efficient than limited 
dependent variable esimators. However, the linear probability model has the key 
advantage of having straightforward interpretations of the regression coefficients. 
In producing estimates from the linear probability models, we compute and use 
Huber-White heteroskedasticity-robust, clustered (at the individual level) standard 
errors and allow efficiency improvement in standard errors.   
Alternative specification (interaction with herd size) 
As discussed in the introduction, it is possible that the policies affect small and 
large farms differently. To explore the heterogeneous effects of policies on farms that 
differ in herd size, we estimate the following alternative specification: 
E [qijt= 1|Pjt
C, Pjt







M×Sizeijt)+ βCrisist +γ´X ijt+μ Trendt +λj    (2)                                  
where, in addition to the variables that are included in equation (1), we also include 
two interaction terms (between pre-Scandal herd size and the two policy variables: 
Pjt
C×Sizeijt and Pjt
M×Sizeijt).   
 
Results 
Tables 6-11 report the estimation results. Tables 6, 7 and 8 report estimates for 
the coefficients from Equation (1), the basic results. Table 9, 10 and 11 report them 
for Equation (2), the heterogeneous analysis. Table 6 and 9 show the estimation 
results for the dependent variable which takes the value of 1 if the household is a 
producer living/working in a cow hotel. Table 7 and 10 show the results for the 
dependent variable which takes the value of 1 if the household is a backyard producer. 
Table 8 and 11 show the results for the dependent variable that equals 1 if the 
household has exited dairy production at some point of time between the outbreak of 
the Milk Scandal and the survey. Due to the closeness of the timing of the Scandal 
and the implementation of the two policies, we include different combinations of the 
three variables of interest in each set of regressions (for the same dependent variable) 
to check the robustness of our estimates. 
Impact of the Policies on the Structure of Production 
Our results show that the Cow Hotel Policy, which sought to mobilize 
backyard producers to check into cow hotels, in fact, increases the probability of 
farmers to join a cow hotel (Table 6). The size of the coefficient suggests that the  
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policy efforts of the government increased the probability of dairy producers being in 
a cow hotel by 11% (column 10, row 1). Interestingly, the Marketing Management 
Policy, which regulates milk buying and delivery, increases the cow hotel production 
even more, by 23% (Table 6, column 10, row 2). The estimates are robust and highly 
significant across all specifications. The only exception is in the regressions where we 
include both sets of policy variables—the variable measuring the Cow Hotel Policy 
and the variable measuring the Marketing Management Policy. When including both 
policy variables, the coefficients change slightly with different combinations of these 
variables in the regressions (Table 6, row 1 and 2). 
Our results also demonstrate that the Cow Hotel Policy reduces backyard 
production by 10% (Table 7, column 10, row 1). The coefficient is robust across the 
ten specifications (Table 7, row 1). However, the Marketing Management Policy does 
not seem to affect backyard production (Table 7, column 10, row 2). The coefficient 
of this policy varies when we include or exclude the variable of dairy crisis. This 
almost certainly indicates a high level of correlation between these two variables. In 
this specification, the coefficient on the Marketing Management Policy variable is 
nearly zero. If this measures the true effect, it means that Marketing Management 
Policy has not been effective in reducing backyard dairy production. 
Finally, consistent with the findings of Jia et al. (2011), the Marketing 
Management Policy reduces the probability of dairy farmers to exit dairy sector 
(Table 8). The size of the coefficient reveals that the policy reduces the fall in the 
household’s participation in dairy production by 23% (column 10, row 2). The  
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magnitude in Jia et al. (2011) is similar (their estimation is 27%). In contrast, the Cow 
Hotel Policy does not exhibit any impact on quitting dairy production. However, there 
is a lot of variation in the sign of the variable and its robustness across specifications 
(Table 8, row 1). 
Farm Size and Policy Effects 
Our results also suggest there are heterogeneous effects. The most significant 
differences across households are found when we look at the effect of the Marketing 
Management Policy on the structure of the dairy production. The interaction terms 
between the policy and herd size suggest that larger farms are more likely to shift 
from backyard production to cow hotels if the Marketing Management Policy is 
implemented in the local township (Table 9, column 10, row 4; Table 10, column 10, 
row 4). The coefficient indicates that, given this policy, by having one more cow in 
the backyard, the probability that the household will check into cow hotels rises by 
1% (Table 9, column 10, row 4; Table 10, column 10, row 4). The estimates are robust 
across all specifications. 
Interestingly, the Cow Hotel Policy does not show heterogeneous effects on 
checking into cow hotels or quitting backyard production (Table 9-11, row 2). A 
possible explanation is that this policy is meant to move all backyard producers into 
cow hotels once a local cow hotel is established. Farms of different herd sizes face 





In the immediate aftermath of the Milk Scandal of 2008, China’s government 
responded to the crisis by issuing a series of policies. The overall goal of these dairy 
policies was to encourage producers to organize themselves in ways that would allow 
for both more efficient production and more effective monitoring of quality. For 
example, the Cow Hotel Policy ordered local officials to try to convince dairy farmers 
to check into the centralized complexes—cow hotels, which in theory, would 
facilitate more efficient production of more sanitary and higher quality milk. The 
Marketing Management Policy was designed to regulate and restore the supply chain 
and facilitate the procurement of milk from larger and more reliable dairy farms.   
Given the nature and high profile of the government policies, there is 
surprisingly little empirical evidence on their impacts on the dairy production 
structure. Therefore, the goal of our study was to gain a better understanding of which 
farmers (with what characteristics) were most likely to join cow hotels and whether 
the Cow Hotel Policy (and/or the Marketing Management Policy) was effective in 
inducing farmers to check into cow hotels (and, if the policy was the driving force in 
changing the production structure of the dairy industry in Greater Beijing).   
In summary, we found that one year after the Milk Scandal, the dairy 
production structure changed substantially. Approximately one quarter (26%) of our 
sample had checked in the cow hotels (increasing from 2% in August 2008). Despite 
the policy efforts of the government, 60% of the sample dairy farmers decided to 
continue with backyard production (decreasing from 98% in August 2008); 14% of 
dairy farmers decided to quit dairy production.    
31 
 
Our results also demonstrated that the increase in cow hotel production could 
largely be attributed to the Cow Hotel Policy and the Marketing Management Policy. 
The Cow Hotel Policy was shown to increase the probability of farmers to join a cow 
hotel by 11%. The driving force of the change, however, seemed to be the Marketing 
Management Policy, since it was shown to increase the cow hotel production by 
23%.   
Moreover, our results suggested that the effects of government policy differed 
across farm sizes. When policy makers implemented the Marketing Management 
Policy, larger farms in our sample were more likely to join cow hotels and less likely 
to maintain backyard production. Why is this? It is likely because the policy provided 
incentives to milk marketing enterprises to procure from larger dairy units 
(complexes such as the cow hotels). When the marketing incentives were added to 
the profit-loss mix, it appears that larger farms benefited more than smaller farms (if 
they join cow hotels). It might also be that the cost of joining a cow hotel is lower for 
larger farms.   
These hypotheses regarding the higher benefit for larger farms are consistent 
with other information obtained during the survey. In our interviews, farmers often 
complained about bad management at some cow hotels, delays in the payment for 
milk, unstable feed costs (as well as the costs for other inputs) and (perhaps above all) 
the high opportunity costs of travelling far from home to take care of the cows. In our 
sample, for example, 60% of farmers who did not join a cow hotel indicated that ―the  
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cow hotels are too far‖ or ―there are no cow hotels in their village.‖ Nearly 10% 
stated simply that ―their herd size is too small.‖   
Overall, these results suggest that during the first year after the crisis, the 
government policies have been effective in moving some of the backyard farmers 
into cow hotels (although 60% farmers remained backyard producing). Policy and 
research questions remain, however, about what will happen to the cow hotels in the 
long run, as the dairy industry recovers from the crisis shock. Is this production 
structure sustainable? Will the number of cow hotel producers continue to grow? 
Will the smaller farms be more interested in joining cow hotels? Are quality and 
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Table 1. The structure of dairy production in rural villages in the Greater Beijing 











dairy sector   
(%) 
Aug. 2008 
c   121  98    2    0   
Sep. 2008
 c  121  98    2    1   
Oct. 2008
 c  121  79    17    3   
Jan. 2009
 c  121  74    20    7   
May. 2009
 c  121  65    24    12   
Sep.2009 
c  121  60    26    14   
Note:   
a The total sample size is 121, which include all the households who engaged in 
dairy production in August 2008. 
b The figures in this table are all month-end data. 
c Each row of three percentage figures should add up to 100. All farmers (who were 
in dairy production before the Milk Scandal) must be in one (and only one) of the 
three categories (engaged in backyard production; producing in a cow hotel; exited 
from dairy production). Some rows add to 101 or 99 because of rounding.   





Table 2. Townships that have received policy directives for Cow Hotel Policy and 
Marketing Management Policy in Greater Beijing between August 2008 and 
September 2009. 
Note:   
a The total township size is 14, which include all the townships that have dairy 
farmers in August 2008. 
b The figures in this table are all month-end data. 
Source: authors’ own survey (2009). 
Policy variables 
  Number of townships that have received the 


















Cow Hotel Policy  14  0  0  8  12  13  13 
Marketing Management Policy  14  0  0  9  9  9  9  
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Table 3. Percentage change of cow hotel producers in Greater Beijing by month in which policies 
were implemented in the township from August 2008 to September 2009. 
 
   
No. of 
townships   
No. of 
households 
Cow hotel producers (%)
c 














Cow Hotel Policy 
a               
No  1  7  0  0  0  0  0  0 





               
No  5  23  4  4  4  4  9  13 
Yes  9  98  1  1  20  27  28  29 
Note: 
a In order to give a rough comparison between the townships in which the policies were 
implemented and the ones in which they were not, the Cow Hotel Policy takes its value in 
September 2009 (the last period of our sample). Therefore, ―No‖ indicates that the township 
government had not received policy directives by September 2009 and ―Yes‖ indicates that the 
township government had received policy directives by September 2009.   
b The Marketing Management Policy is created in the same way as the Cow hotel Policy (see the 
note above). 













Table 4. Percentage of cow hotel producers by township policies in September 2009 and 
pre-Scandal herd size terciles. 
 
Policy variable  No. of households 
Cow hotel producers (%) by terciles of 
pre-Scandal herd size
 c d   
Herd size 
≤5 




Cow Hotel Policy 
a       
No  7    0  0 
Yes  114  16  24  50 
Marketing Management Policy 
b     
No  23  11    0    33 
Yes  98  18    28  46 
Note:   
a In order to give a rough comparison between the townships in which the policies were 
implemented and the ones in which they were not, the Cow Hotel Policy takes its value in 
September 2009 (the last period of our sample). Therefore, ―No‖ indicates that the township 
government had not received policy directives by September 2009 and ―Yes‖ indicates that the 
township government had received policy directives by September 2009.   
b The Marketing Management Policy is created in the same way as the Cow hotel Policy (see the 
note above).
 
c The figures in this table are all month-end data. 
d In this table, we look at how farms with different herd sizes have responded to the different 
policies that have been implemented in response to the Milk Scandal. This is done by linking 
farm size with post-Scandal production structures (cow hotel, backyard production and quitting 





Table 5. Percentage of backyard producers, cow hotel producers and those that exited the dairy 
industry by pre-Scandal characteristics in Greater Beijing area. 
 
   
   
Categories 












sector (%)     
Herd size (number of cows)       
1    ≤7  67  18  66  16 
2    >7  54  35  54  11 
Education (years)       
3    ≤6    51  29  57  14 
4    >6  70  23  63  14 
Age (years)       
5    ≤35  62  29  58  13 
6    >35  59  22  63  15 
Asset value per capita (1000 yuan)       
7    ≤1.14  60  30  57  13 
8    >1.14  61  21  64  15 
Percentage of off-farm labor       
9    ≤25%  62  29  58  13 
10    >25%  59  22  63  15 
Dairy training       
11    No  86  20  65  15 
12    Yes  35  40  49  11 
Villagers in dairy company       
13    No  76  33  53  14 
14    Yes  45  13  73  13 
Percentage of dairy households in the village       
15    ≤15.7  62  23  53  24 
16      >15.7  59  29  68  3 
Note: We do not include the post-Scandal characteristics as controls because they may be 
affected by the policies that were implemented to counter the Milk Scandal. If these 
characteristics are also correlated with the production decisions of farmers (that is, if the farmer 
moved his/her dairy cows into the cow hotel), they might not act as efficiency-enhancing control 
variables in our regressions (Angrist and Pischke, 2008). 
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Table 6. Results of multivariate analysis estimating the effect of Cow Hotel and Marketing Management policies on cow hotel production in 
Greater Beijing from August 2008 to September 2009 (OLS with township fixed effects). 
  Dependent variable: Cow hotel producer, =1 yes, =0 no                             
      1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
1.  Cow Hotel Policy: (Yes=1;No=0)    0.16***    0.09***  0.11***    0.16***    0.09***  0.11*** 
    [4.50]    [3.18]  [3.27]          [4.47]    [3.16]  [3.25]       
                     
2.  Marketing Management Policy: 
(Yes=1;No=0) 
    0.20***  0.17***  0.23***      0.20***  0.17***  0.23*** 
      [4.86]  [4.55]  [4.54]            [4.83]  [4.53]  [4.52]       
                     
3.  Herd Size            0.00    0.00    0.00    0.00    0.00   
            [1.28]  [1.28]  [1.28]  [1.28]  [1.28]       
                     
4.  Dairy crisis (1=months after Sept. 
2008; 0=months before) 
0.16***        -0.09**    0.16***        -0.09**   
  [4.69]        [-2.44]        [4.66]        [-2.43]       
                     
5.  Education (years)            0.00    0.00    0.00    0.00    0.00   
            [0.16]  [0.16]  [0.16]  [0.16]  [0.16]       
                     
6.  Age (years)            -0.00**  -0.00**  -0.00**  -0.00**  -0.00**   
            [-2.00]  [-2.00]  [-2.00]  [-2.00]  [-2.00]       
                     
7.  Percentage of off-farm labor              -0.21**  -0.21**  -0.21**  -0.21**  -0.21**   
            [-2.53]  [-2.53]  [-2.53]  [-2.53]  [-2.52]       
                     
8.  Asset value per capita (1000 yuan)            -0.04***  -0.04***  -0.04***  -0.04***  -0.04*** 
            [-3.15]  [-3.15]  [-3.15]  [-3.15]  [-3.15]       
                     
9.  Dairy Training            0.08  0.08  0.08  0.08  0.08 
            [1.55]  [1.55]  [1.55]  [1.55]  [1.55]       
                     
10.  Villagers in dairy company            -0.05  -0.05  -0.05  -0.05  -0.05 
            [-0.33]  [-0.33]  [-0.33]  [-0.33]  [-0.33]       
                     
11.  Percentage of dairy households in 
the village 
          0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01 
            [1.19]  [1.19]  [1.19]  [1.19]  [1.19]       
                     
12.  Time trend  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
13.  Township effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
14.  N  726  726  726  726  726  726  726  726  726  726 
15.  R
2  0.32    0.32    0.33    0.34    0.34    0.39    0.39    0.41    0.41    0.41   
Note: t-statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. The regression model that includes variables that measure both the Cow Hotel Policy and the 
Marketing Management Policy (as well as a full set of control variables) is shown in the last column of the table. 
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Table 7. Results of multivariate analysis estimating the effect of Cow Hotel and Marketing Management policies on backyard 
production in Greater Beijing from August 2008 to September 2009 (OLS with township fixed effects). 
  Dependent variable: Backyard producer, =1 yes, =0 no 
      1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
1.  Cow Hotel 
Policy(Yes=1;No=0) 
  -0.18***    -0.14***  -0.10**      -0.18***    -0.14***  -0.10**   
    [-4.20]    [-3.32]  [-2.28]          [-4.18]    [-3.30]  [-2.27]       
                     
2.  Marketing Management Policy 
(Yes=1;No=0) 
    -0.15***  -0.09**  0.00        -0.15***  -0.09**  -0.00   
      [-3.21]  [-2.09]  [-0.04]            [-3.19]  [-2.08]  [-0.04]       
                     
3.  Herd size            -0.00    -0.00    -0.00    -0.00    -0.00   
            [-0.08]  [-0.08]  [-0.08]  [-0.08]  [-0.08]       
                     
4.  Dairy crisis (1=months after 
Sept. 2008; 0=months before) 
-0.18***        -0.12    -0.18***        -0.12   
  [-4.76]        [-1.64]        [-4.74]        [-1.63]       
                     
5.  Education (years)            0.02*  0.02*  0.02*  0.02*  0.02*     
            [1.75]  [1.75]  [1.75]  [1.75]  [1.75]       
                     
6.  Age (years)            0.01**  0.01**  0.01**  0.01**  0.01**   
            [2.52]  [2.52]  [2.52]  [2.52]  [2.52]       
                     
7.  Percentage of off-farm labor              0.08  0.08  0.08  0.08  0.08 
            [0.67]  [0.67]  [0.67]  [0.67]  [0.67]       
                     
8.  Asset value per capita (1000 
yuan) 
          0.04***  0.04***  0.04***  0.04***  0.04*** 
            [3.17]  [3.17]  [3.17]  [3.17]  [3.16]       
                     
9.  Dairy Training            -0.06  -0.06  -0.06  -0.06  -0.06 
            [-1.19]  [-1.19]  [-1.19]  [-1.19]  [-1.19]       
                     
10.  Villagers in dairy company            -0.05  -0.05  -0.05  -0.05  -0.05 
            [-0.27]  [-0.27]  [-0.27]  [-0.27]  [-0.27]       
                     
11.  Percentage of dairy households 
in the village 
          -0.00    -0.00    -0.00    -0.00    -0.00   
            [-0.64]  [-0.64]  [-0.64]  [-0.64]  [-0.64]       
                     
12.  Time trend  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
13.  Township effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
                       
14.  N  726  726  726  726  726  726  726  726  726  726 
15.  R
2  0.29    0.29    0.29    0.29    0.30    0.35    0.35    0.35    0.35    0.36   
Note: t-statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. The regression model that includes variables that measure both the Cow Hotel Policy 
and the Marketing Management Policy (as well as a full set of control variables) is shown in the last column of the table.  
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Table 8. Results of multivariate analysis estimating the effect of Cow Hotel and Marketing Management policies on quitting dairy 
production in Greater Beijing from August 2008 to September 2009 (OLS with township fixed effects). 
  Dependent variable: Exited the dairy sector, =1 yes, =0 no 
      1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
1.  Cow Hotel Policy (Yes=1;No=0)    0.02    0.05  -0.01    0.02    0.05  -0.01 
    [0.83]    [1.31]  [-0.32]    [0.74]    [1.54]  [-0.34] 
                     
2.  Marketing Management Policy 
(Yes=1;No=0) 
    -0.05  -0.08  -0.23***      -0.05**  -0.08**  -0.23*** 
      [-1.55]  [-1.58]  [-6.78]      [-2.26]  [-2.32]  [-2.99] 
                     
3.  Herd size            -0.00**  -0.00**  -0.00**  -0.00**  -0.00** 
            [-2.34]  [-2.34]  [-2.34]  [-2.34]  [-2.34] 
                     
4.  Dairy crisis (1=months after Sept. 
2008; 0=months before) 
0.02        0.21***  0.02        0.21*** 
  [1.27]        [4.86]  [1.07]        [2.89] 
                     
5.  Education (years)            -0.02**  -0.02**  -0.02**  -0.02**  -0.02** 
            [-2.40]  [-2.40]  [-2.40]  [-2.40]  [-2.40] 
                     
6.  Age (years)            -0.00  -0.00  -0.00  -0.00  -0.00 
            [-1.32]  [-1.32]  [-1.32]  [-1.32]  [-1.32] 
                     
7.  Percentage of off-farm labor              0.13  0.13  0.13  0.13  0.13 
            [1.41]  [1.41]  [1.41]  [1.41]  [1.41] 
                     
8.  Asset value per capita (1000 yuan)            -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01 
            [-0.91]  [-0.91]  [-0.91]  [-0.90]  [-0.90] 
                     
9.  Dairy Training            -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01 
            [-0.39]  [-0.39]  [-0.39]  [-0.39]  [-0.39] 
                     
10.  Villagers in dairy company            0.10  0.10  0.10  0.10  0.10 
            [1.27]  [1.27]  [1.27]  [1.27]  [1.27] 
                     
11.  Percentage of dairy households in the 
village 
          -0.00  -0.00  -0.00  -0.00  -0.00 
            [-0.95]  [-0.95]  [-0.95]  [-0.95]  [-0.95] 
                     
12.  Time trend  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
13.  Township effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
                       
14.  N  726  726  726  726  726  726  726  726  726  726 
15.  R
2  0.13  0.13  0.13  0.14  0.16  0.19  0.19  0.19  0.20  0.22 
Note: t-statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. The regression model that includes variables that measure both the Cow Hotel Policy 
and the Marketing Management Policy (as well as a full set of control variables) is shown in the last column of the table.  
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Table 9. Results of multivariate analysis estimating the heterogeneous effects of Cow Hotel and Marketing Management policies on 
cow hotel production in Greater Beijing from August 2008 to September 2009 (OLS with township fixed effects). 
 
  Dependent variable: Cow hotel producer, =1 yes, =0 no 
      1  2  3  4  5  6 
1.  Cow Hotel Policy (Yes=1;No=0)  0.15***  0.07*      0.08**  0.11*** 
  [2.97]  [1.66]      [2.54]  [3.02] 
   
Cow Hotel Policy * Herd size 
           
2.  0.00  0.00      0.00  0.00 
  [0.53]  [0.49]      [0.47]  [0.70] 
   
Marketing Management Policy (Yes=1;No=0) 
           
3.      0.08  0.09  0.05  0.12* 
      [1.47]  [1.54]  [0.93]  [1.90] 
   
Marketing Management Policy * Herd size 
           
4.      0.01***  0.01***  0.01***  0.01*** 
      [3.03]  [3.03]  [3.08]  [3.08] 
   
Herd size 
           
5.  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  -0.00  -0.00 
  [1.09]  [1.14]  [0.46]  [0.46]  [-0.15]  [-0.35] 
               
6.  Dairy crisis (1=months after Sept. 2008; 0=months before) 
 
  0.11***    -0.01    -0.10** 
    [3.70]    [-0.68]    [-2.57] 
             
7.  Education (years)  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
  [0.16]  [0.16]  [0.20]  [0.20]  [0.20]  [0.20] 
             
8.  Age (years)  -0.00**  -0.00**  -0.00*  -0.00*  -0.00*  -0.00* 
  [-1.99]  [-1.99]  [-1.72]  [-1.72]  [-1.71]  [-1.71] 
             
9.  Percentage of off-farm labor    -0.21**  -0.21**  -0.20**  -0.20**  -0.20**  -0.20** 
  [-2.53]  [-2.52]  [-2.50]  [-2.50]  [-2.50]  [-2.50] 
             
10.  Asset value per capita (1000 yuan)  -0.04***  -0.04***  -0.03***  -0.03***  -0.03***  -0.03*** 
  [-3.12]  [-3.12]  [-3.08]  [-3.08]  [-3.06]  [-3.05] 
             
11.  Dairy Training  0.08  0.08  0.07  0.07  0.07  0.07 
  [1.55]  [1.55]  [1.47]  [1.47]  [1.47]  [1.47] 
             
12.  Villagers in dairy company  -0.05  -0.05  -0.07  -0.07  -0.07  -0.07 
  [-0.32]  [-0.33]  [-0.52]  [-0.52]  [-0.52]  [-0.52] 
             
13.  Percentage of dairy households in the village  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01 
  [1.18]  [1.18]  [1.47]  [1.47]  [1.46]  [1.46]  
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14.    Time trend  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
15.  Township effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
               
16.  N  726  726  726  726  726  726 
17.  R
2  0.39  0.40  0.43  0.43  0.43  0.44 
Note: t-statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.   
The regression model that includes variables that measure both the Cow Hotel Policy and the Marketing Management Policy (as well as a full set of control variables) is shown in 
the last column of the table. 
In this table, we look at how farms with different herd sizes have responded to the different policies that have been implemented in response to the Milk Scandal. This is done by 




Table 10. Results of multivariate analysis estimating the heterogeneous effects of Cow Hotel and Marketing Management policies on 
backyard production in Greater Beijing from August 2008 to September 2009 (OLS with township fixed effects). 
 
  Dependent variable: Backyard producer, =1 yes, =0 no 
    1  2  3  4  5  6 
1.  Cow Hotel Policy (Yes=1;No=0)  -0.18***  -0.10*      -0.16***  -0.13** 
  [-3.35]  [-1.96]      [-3.09]  [-2.56] 
             
2.  Cow Hotel Policy * Herd size  0.00  0.00      0.00  0.00 
  [0.02]  [0.07]      [0.53]  [0.68] 
             
3.  Marketing Management Policy (Yes=1;No=0)      -0.04  0.12  0.02  0.11 
      [-0.66]  [1.18]  [0.34]  [1.09] 
             
4.  Marketing Management Policy * Herd size      -0.01**  -0.01**  -0.01***  -0.01*** 
      [-2.46]  [-2.45]  [-2.63]  [-2.62] 
             
5.  Herd size  -0.00  -0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
  [-0.13]  [-0.18]  [1.42]  [1.42]  [0.66]  [0.44] 
             
6.  Dairy crisis (1=months after Sept. 2008; 0=months before)    -0.13***    -0.19***    -0.12 
    [-3.52]    [-2.66]    [-1.58] 
             
7.  Education (years)  0.02*  0.02*  0.02*  0.02*  0.02*  0.02* 
  [1.75]  [1.75]  [1.74]  [1.74]  [1.73]  [1.73] 
             
8.  Age (years)  0.01**  0.01**  0.01**  0.01**  0.01**  0.01** 
  [2.52]  [2.52]  [2.27]  [2.27]  [2.26]  [2.26] 
             
9.  Percentage of off-farm labor    0.08  0.08  0.07  0.07  0.07  0.07 
  [0.67]  [0.67]  [0.63]  [0.63]  [0.63]  [0.63] 
             
10.  Asset value per capita (1000 yuan)  0.04***  0.04***  0.04***  0.04***  0.04***  0.04*** 
  [3.16]  [3.16]  [3.08]  [3.07]  [3.06]  [3.06] 
             
11.  Dairy Training  -0.06  -0.06  -0.06  -0.06  -0.06  -0.06 
  [-1.19]  [-1.19]  [-1.14]  [-1.13]  [-1.13]  [-1.13] 
             
12.  Villagers in dairy company  -0.05  -0.05  -0.03  -0.03  -0.02  -0.02 
  [-0.27]  [-0.27]  [-0.15]  [-0.15]  [-0.14]  [-0.14] 
             
13.  Percentage of dairy households in the village  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
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  [-0.64]  [-0.64]  [-0.82]  [-0.82]  [-0.83]  [-0.83] 
             
14.  Time trend  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
15.  Township effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
16.  N  726  726  726  726  726  726 
17.  R
2  0.35  0.36  0.36  0.37  0.37  0.37 
Note: t-statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.   
The regression model that includes variables that measure both the Cow Hotel Policy and the Marketing Management Policy (as well as a full set of control variables) is shown in 
the last column of the table. 
In this table, we look at how farms with different herd sizes have responded to the different policies that have been implemented in response to the Milk Scandal. This is done by 




Table 11. Results of multivariate analysis estimating the heterogeneous effects of Cow Hotel and Marketing Management policies on 
quitting dairy production in Greater Beijing from August 2008 to September 2009 (OLS with township fixed effects). 
 
  Dependent variable: Exited the dairy sector, =1 yes, =0 no 
      1  2  3  4  5  6 
1.  Cow Hotel Policy (Yes=1;No=0)  0.04  0.03      0.08*  0.02 
  [1.18]  [0.83]      [1.71]  [0.49] 
               
2.  Cow Hotel Policy * Herd size  -0.00  -0.00      -0.00  -0.00** 
  [-1.50]  [-1.52]      [-1.63]  [-2.23] 
             
3.  Marketing Management Policy (Yes=1;No=0)      -0.04  -0.21**  -0.07  -0.23** 
      [-0.94]  [-2.42]  [-1.35]  [-2.59] 
             
4.  Marketing Management Policy * Herd size      -0.00  -0.00  -0.00  -0.00 
      [-0.66]  [-0.66]  [-0.40]  [-0.40] 
             
5.  Herd size  -0.00  -0.00  -0.00**  -0.00**  -0.00  -0.00 
  [-1.46]  [-1.45]  [-2.04]  [-2.04]  [-1.03]  [-0.33] 
             
6.  Dairy crisis (1=months after Sept. 2008; 0=months before)    0.01    0.20***    0.22*** 
    [0.67]    [2.84]    [3.03] 
             
7.  Education (years)  -0.02**  -0.02**  -0.02**  -0.02**  -0.02**  -0.02** 
  [-2.40]  [-2.40]  [-2.40]  [-2.39]  [-2.39]  [-2.39] 
             
8.  Age (years)  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
  [-1.33]  [-1.32]  [-1.34]  [-1.34]  [-1.33]  [-1.33] 
             
9.  Percentage of off-farm labor    0.13  0.13  0.13  0.13  0.13  0.13 
  [1.42]  [1.42]  [1.41]  [1.41]  [1.42]  [1.42] 
             
10.  Asset value per capita (1000 yuan)  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01 
  [-0.92]  [-0.92]  [-0.93]  [-0.93]  [-0.93]  [-0.94] 
             
11.  Dairy Training  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01 
  [-0.40]  [-0.39]  [-0.37]  [-0.37]  [-0.38]  [-0.38] 
             
12.  Villagers in dairy company  0.10  0.10  0.10  0.10  0.10  0.10 
  [1.26]  [1.26]  [1.28]  [1.28]  [1.25]  [1.25] 
             
13.  Percentage of dairy households in the village  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
  [-0.95]  [-0.94]  [-0.98]  [-0.98]  [-0.95]  [-0.94]  
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14.  Time trend  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
15.  Township effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
16.  N  726  726  726  726  726  726 
17.  R
2  0.19  0.19  0.19  0.22  0.20  0.22 
Note: t-statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.   
The regression model that includes variables that measure both the Cow Hotel Policy and the Marketing Management Policy (as well as a full set of control variables) is shown in 
the last column of the table. 
In this table, we look at how farms with different herd sizes have responded to the different policies that have been implemented in response to the Milk Scandal. This is done by 




Appendix 1. Descriptive statistics of the cow hotels in the Greater Beijing in September 2009. 
        Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
1  Total herd size  795.6  789.8  150  2400 
2  Herd size per household  28.6  28.1  10  100 
3  Geographic source of farmers (%)         
4  Within local village  52.3  36.4  0  96 
5  Neighborhood villages in local town  26.2  20.6  2  55.93 
6  Other towns in county  11.4  14.4  0  36.36 
7  Other counties  2.3  6  0  18.18 
8  Investment per farm (1000 yuan)  151.3  175.7  23.82  600 
9  Invested by (%)         
10  Private person  61.4  46.8  0  100 
11  Dairy farmers  6.7  20  0  60 
12  Dairy processing firms  0  0  0  0 
13  Government  19.7  28.1  0  67 
14  The cow hotel standardizes (%)         
15  Concentrated feed  67  50  0  100 
16  Breeding  44  53  0  100 
17  Quarantine and disease control  100  0  100  100 
18  Waste management  22  44  0  100 
19  Milk procurement (%)         
20  Contract with cow hotel farmers  100  0  100  100 
21  Test raw milk safety  78  44  0  100 
22  Sales (%)         
23  Written contract with buyers  100  0  100  100 
24  The buyer sends staff for supervision  100  0  100  100 
25  The buyer tests the safety of raw milk  100  0  100  100 





                                                 
1  In this section, we primarily review the Lu and Tao (2009) case study which seeks to explain, among other things, why milk suppliers (traders and milk collection stations) began 
to add melamine to the milk supply. We include this as part of the background for the uninformed reader to allow him/her to better understand the full context of our study. In some 
sense, however, the story by Lu and Tao should be considered a hypothesis. The motivation, goal, approach and findings of this paper do not rely on why melamine was added (or 
even who added). We are focused on what happened after the melamine was added, discovered and the fallout from the scandal sent the dairy industry into crisis.   
 
2  Details of the Greater Beijing Horticulture and Marketing Survey can be found in Huang et al. (2010). 
 
3  In executing the second round of the panel survey we were able to trace 231 of the original 243 sample households. This implies that the attrition rate was only five percent. For 
panel surveys that are fielded four years apart, such an attrition rate is low. Glewwe and Jacoby (2000) reviewed panel surveys conducted in developing countries and found that in 
the case of many panel surveys that are fielded four years and more apart, attrition rates range from 6% to 43%. To make sure that the absence of the five percent of the households 
did not create any selection bias in our sample, during the survey to the best of our ability we documented the reasons for not being able to find the households for the re-survey. 
Among the 12 households that dropped out, four had moved out of the village (to the city); four households were engaged in off-farm activities that kept them out of the village 
most of the year (e.g., as long distance truck drivers); and four households had disappeared due to the death (or severe illness) of the household head. Of the 12 households that had 
dropped out, four were dairy households in 2004. In an analysis of the differences of the characteristics between households that had dropped out and those that remained in the 
sample, our data show that the surveyed/attrited households do not differ in terms of education and age of head, asset value per capita or land per capita.   
 
4  A few cow hotels were self-organized by dairy producers before the Scandal. In late 1980s, the initial type that is similar with cow hotels emerged in some villages where 
livestock production has reached certain scale (China Livestock Press, 2005). It evolved into the current type only after 2000.   